

bought with the massive resources in the hands of the presidency, won him the PDP nomination and swept him to victory in April 2011.

These developments demonstrated the continuing deficits of legitimacy for the government as well as the democratic system. As Nigeria's political elites continue to flout the rules of the system, it is inevitable that patronage, coercion, and personal interest will drive policy more than the interests of the public. President Jonathan's first year has so far followed this pattern of "Big Man" prebendal politics—with one important exception: He appointed a credible chairman of the nation's electoral commission, Attahiru Jega. Jega had only a few months to prepare for the April 2011 election, but his reforms assured a more credible outcome than 2007, and hold the promise of significant change for 2015 as more sweeping reforms within the commission begin to take hold.

The Bureaucracy

As government was increasingly "Africanized" before independence, the bureaucracy became a way to reward individuals in the patrimonial system (see "Current Challenges: Prebendalism"). Individuals were appointed on the basis of patronage, ethnic group, and regional origin rather than merit.

It is conservatively estimated that federal and state government personnel increased from 72,000 at independence to well over 1 million by the mid-1980s. The salaries of these bureaucrats presently consume roughly half of government expenditures. Several of President Obasanjo's progressive ministers undertook extensive reforms within their ministries, with some successes, but which the bureaucracy fought at every turn.

Semipublic Institutions

Among the largest components of the national administration in Nigeria are numerous state-owned enterprises, usually referred to as **parastatals**. In general, parastatals are established for several reasons. First, they furnish public facilities, including water, power, telecommunications, ports, and other transportation, at lower cost than private companies. Secondly, they were introduced to accelerate economic development by controlling the commanding heights of the economy, including steel production, petroleum and natural gas production, refining, petrochemicals, fertilizer, and certain areas of agriculture. Thirdly, there is a nationalist dimension that relates to issues of sovereignty over sectors perceived sensitive for national security.

Prebendalism

Prebendalism is the disbursing of public offices and state rents to one's ethnic clients. It is an extreme form of clientelism that refers to the practice of mobilizing cultural and other sectional identities by political aspirants and officeholders for the purpose of corruptly appropriating state resources. Prebendalism is an established pattern of political behavior that justifies the pursuit of and the use of public office for the personal benefit of the officeholder and his clients. The official public purpose of the office becomes a secondary concern. As with clientelism, the officeholder's clients comprise a specific set of elites to which he is linked, typically by ethnic or religious ties. This linkage is key to understanding the concept. There are thus two sides involved in prebendalism, the officeholder and the client, and expectations of benefits by the clients (or supporters) perpetuate the prebendal system in a pyramid fashion with a "Big Man" or "godfather" at the top and echelons of intermediate Big Men and clients below.¹⁹

parastatals

State-owned industries or businesses. Sometimes the government will own and manage the company outright, or only own a majority share of its stock but allow members of the private sector to run it.

As practiced in the Babangida and Abacha eras, when official corruption occurred on an unprecedented scale, prebendalism deepened sectional cleavages and eroded the resources of the state. It also discouraged genuinely productive activity in the economy and expanded the class of individuals who live off state patronage.

As long as prebendalism remains the norm, a stable democracy will be elusive. Because these practices are deeply embedded, they are more difficult to uproot. The corruption resulting from prebendal practices is blamed for the enormous overseas flight of capital into private accounts of each president in turn. For instance, much of the \$12.2 billion oil windfall of the early 1990s is believed to have been pocketed by Babangida and senior members of his regime. General Abacha diverted at least \$5 billion from the Nigerian central bank, and President Obasanjo and members of his administration were questioned for the disappearance of more than \$10 billion into the power sector alone. Transparency International regularly lists Nigeria among the most corrupt countries in the world.

Privatizing the parastatals was a central plank of the reform strategy under the Obasanjo administration. The telecommunications and power industries were put up for sale, and the administration promised to sell parts of the oil industry and privatize part or all of the NNPC. Open licensing in the telecommunications sector after 1999 ushered in a cellular phone boom that has revolutionized Nigerian society and made the country one of the fastest-growing cellular markets in the world. Privatization of the national landline network and the power industries, however, became patronage boondoggles rife with corruption.

Other State Institutions

Other institutions of governance and policy-making, including the federal judiciary and subnational governments (incorporating state and local courts), operate within the context of a strong central government dominated by a powerful chief executive.

The Judiciary

At one time, the Nigerian judiciary enjoyed relative autonomy from the executive arm. Aggrieved individuals and organizations could take the government to court and expect a judgment based on the merits of their case. This situation changed as each successive military government demonstrated a profound disdain for judicial practices, and eventually it undermined not only the autonomy but also the very integrity of the judiciary as a third branch of government.

The Buhari, Babangida, and Abacha regimes, in particular, issued a spate of repressive decrees disallowing judicial review. Through the executive's power of appointment of judicial officers to the high bench, as well as the executive's control of judicial budgets, the government came to dominate the courts. In addition, the once highly competent judiciary was undermined severely by declining standards of legal training and bribery. The decline of court independence reached a low in 1993 when the Supreme Court placed all actions of the military executive beyond judicial review. The detention and hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists in 1995 underscored the politicization and compromised state of the judicial system.

With the return of civilian rule in 1999, however, the courts have slowly begun to restore some independence and credibility. In early 2002, for instance, the Supreme Court passed two landmark judgments. The first struck down a 2001 election law that would have prevented new parties from contesting the national elections in 2003—a

decision that contravened the wishes of the president and the ruling party. The Court also decided against the governors of Nigeria's coastal states over control of the vast offshore gas reserves, declaring these to be under the jurisdiction of the federal government. Since the farcical 2007 elections, the courts have overturned twelve gubernatorial races and a host of legislative contests, and the Supreme Court reviewed the presidential election as well.

State and Local Judiciaries The judiciaries at the state level are subordinate to the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Some of the states in the northern part of the country with large Muslim populations maintain a parallel court system based on the Islamic *shari'a* (religious law). Similarly, some states in the Middle Belt and southern part of the country have subsidiary courts based on customary law (see Table 12.1). Each of these maintains an appellate division. Otherwise, all courts of record in the country are based on the English common law tradition, and all courts are ultimately bound by decisions handed down by the Supreme Court.

shari'a

Islamic law derived mostly from the Qur'an and the examples set by the Prophet Muhammad in the Sunnah.

How to apply the *shari'a* has been a source of continuing debate in Nigerian politics. For several years, some northern groups have participated in a movement to expand the application of *shari'a* law in predominantly Muslim areas of Nigeria, and some even have advocated that it be made the supreme law of the land. Prior to the establishment of the Fourth Republic, *shari'a* courts had jurisdiction only among Muslims in civil proceedings and in questions of Islamic personal law. In November 1999, however, the northern state of Zamfara instituted a version of the *shari'a* criminal code that included cutting off hands for stealing, and stoning to death for those (especially women) who committed adultery. Eleven other northern states adopted the criminal code by 2001, prompting fears among Christian minorities in these states that the code might be applied to them. Two thousand people lost their lives in Kaduna in 2000 when the state installed the *shari'a* criminal code despite a population that is half Christian.

Although the *shari'a* criminal code appears to contradict Nigeria's officially secular constitution, President Obasanjo refused to challenge it, seeing the movement as a "fad." His refusal to challenge *shari'a* saved the nation from a deeply divisive policy debate and gave northern political and legal systems time to adjust. In fact, although the *shari'a* systems in these states have created more vehicles for patronage, they have also opened up new avenues for public action to press government for accountability and reform. In addition, women's groups mobilized against several questionable local *shari'a* court decisions to challenge them at the appellate level, winning landmark decisions that helped to extend women's legal protections under the code.

State and Local Government

Nigeria's centralization of oil revenues has fostered intense competition among local communities and states for access to national patronage. Most states would be insolvent without substantial support from the central government. About 90 percent of state incomes are received directly from the federal government, which includes a lump sum based on oil revenues, plus a percentage of oil income based on population. In all likelihood, only the states of Lagos, Rivers, and Kano could survive without federal subsidies; the rest are thoroughly dependent upon federal revenues.

Despite attempted reforms, most local governments have degenerated into prebendal patronage outposts for the governors to dole out to loyalists. For the most part, they do little to address their governance responsibilities.

Table 12.6		Percentage Contribution of Different Sources of Government Revenue to Allocated Revenue, 1980–2009		
Years	Oil Revenue (Naira Millions)	Non-Oil Revenue (Naira Millions)	Oil as % of Revenue	Non-Oil as % of Revenue
1980	12353	2880	81	19
1981	8564	4726	64	36
1983	7253	3256	69	31
1985	10924	4127	72.5	27.5
1987	19027	6354	75	25
1992	164078	26375	86	14
1994	160192	41718	79	21
1995	324548	135440	70.5	29.5
1996	408783	114814	78	22
2001	1707563	523970	76.5	23.5
2002	1230851	500986	71	29
2003	2074281	500815	80.5	19.5
2007	4462950	1252550	78	22
2008	6530630	1335960	83	17
2009	3191938	865561	78.6	21.4

Source: Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Lagos. From Adedotun Phillips, "Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 21, no. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 109. Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics, *Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1997 Edition*. Nigerian Economic Summit Group, *Economic Indicators* (Vol. 8, no. 2, April–June 2002). Recent data compiled by Evan Litwin and Mukesh Baral.

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The federal, state, and local governments have the constitutional and legal powers to raise funds through taxes. However, Nigerians share an understandable unwillingness to pay taxes and fees to a government with such a poor record of delivering basic services. The result is a vicious cycle: Government is sapped of resources and legitimacy and cannot adequately serve the people. Communities, in turn, are compelled to resort to self-help measures to protect these operations and thus withdraw further from the reach of the state. Because very few individuals and organizations pay taxes, even the most basic government functions are starved of resources, and the states become more dependent upon federal oil wealth in order to function.

The return of democratic rule has meant the return of conflict between the state and national governments. The primary vehicle for conflict since 1999 has been a series of "governors' forums" asserting greater legal control over resources in

Table 12.7		Share of Total Government Expenditure	
Share of Total Government Expenditure	2008	2009	
Federal ¹	3,240,800	3,456,900	
State ²	3,021,600	2,776,900	
Local ³	1,387,900	1,067,614	
Total Expenditure (Naira Millions)	7,650,300	7,301,414	

¹Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report 2009, section 5.4.3; Annual Report 2008, section 5.3.3.

²Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report 2009, section 5.5.3; Annual Report 2008, section 5.4.3.

³Central Bank of Nigeria, Table B.3.1, Summary of Local Govt's Finances. Figures can also be cross-referenced with Annual Report 2009.

Source: Recent data compiled by Evan Litwin and Mukesh Baral.

their states. A number of governors have turned to armed militias and vigilante groups to provide security and to intimidate political opponents. Many of these groups were initially local responses to the corrupt and ineffective police force, or enforcers of the new *shari'a* codes in the north, but the governors have sensed the larger political usefulness of these groups. Consequently, political assassinations and violence increased as the 2003, 2007, and 2011 elections approached. Some of these militias in the Niger Delta or political thugs in other parts of the country have grown independent and turned on their former masters, raising the spectre of local warlords that have ruined other African nations.

The Policy-Making Process

Nigeria's prolonged experience with military rule has resulted in a policy process based more on top-down directives than on consultation, political debate, and legislation. A decade of democratic government has seen important changes, as the legislatures, courts, and state governments have begun to force the presidency to negotiate its policies and work within a constitutional framework. But military rule has left indelible marks on policy-making in Nigeria. Because of their influence in recruitment and promotions, as well as through their own charisma or political connections, senior officers often developed networks of supporters, creating what is referred to as a "loyalty pyramid."²⁰ Once in power, the men at the top of these pyramids in Nigeria, whether military or civilian, gained access to tremendous oil wealth, passed on through the lower echelons of the pyramid to reward support. Often these pyramids reflect ethnic or religious affiliations (see the discussions of corruption in Section 2 and **prebendalism** in Section 3).²¹ Many of the current civilian politicians belonged to the loyalty pyramids of different military men, and their networks resemble the politics of loyalty pyramids among the military.

Civilian policy-making in present-day Nigeria centers largely on presidential initiative in proposing policies, which are then filtered through the interests of the "Big Men." Invariably, their agendas conflict with those of the president and with each other, and policies are consequently blocked or significantly altered. Frequently, the reformist agenda is stalled or ineffectual.

prebendalism

Patterns of political behavior that rest on the justification that official state offices should be utilized for the personal benefit of officeholders as well as of their support group or clients.

Summary

Nigeria has sought a number of institutional and informal solutions to manage the "National Question" posed by its great diversity. Federalism has helped to decentralize government somewhat and preserved a basic measure of unity, but the state- and federal-level executives still retain much of the enormous advantages bestowed upon them by military rule. Military rule also left behind corrupt, prebendal patterns that created the current "Big Man" system dominating the PDP and the nation's politics.



PROFILE



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President Goodluck Jonathan, casting his vote in his Bayelsa state village and wearing a traditional hat common to many Niger Delta communities. He was elected vice president in 2007, named Acting President by the National Assembly on the incapacitation of President Yar'Adua in 2010, and elected president in 2011.

President Goodluck Jonathan

The story goes that President Jonathan's father, a canoe maker from Bayelsa state, had an innate sense that his son was born lucky, and so named him Goodluck. Whether the story is truth or legend, events certainly support its conclusion: Fortune has so far smiled on the president, rocketing him from humble beginnings in the Niger Delta to the center of Nigerian politics. Jonathan worked as both a lecturer and an environmental official while finishing his Ph.D. in zoology. In 1998 he joined the PDP and won the office of deputy governor of Bayelsa state. He then became governor in 2005 when his predecessor was impeached for corruption. When President Obasanjo picked the little-known Yar'Adua as the 2007 presidential candidate for

the PDP, he sought to balance the ticket with someone from the Niger Delta. The other regional governors—having been in office longer—were richer and deemed more powerful, so Obasanjo turned to Jonathan for the vice presidency. As President Yar'Adua's health failed, Jonathan found himself acting president in February 2010 and then president when Yar'Adua passed away in May 2010.

Given this quick ascent, the president has little track record to suggest what direction he will take now that his April 2011 election victory is behind him. Bayelsa politics is infamous for corruption and militant activity, and militias dynamited Jonathan's house the night he was elected vice president in 2007. His wife, Patience, was accused by the EFCC of money laundering in 2006 and forced to return \$13.5 million, although she was never prosecuted. While vice president, Jonathan sought to play a peacemaking role with the major Niger Delta militias without much success, and as president he has promised to revive electricity production and push electoral reform. The latter promise he delivered upon, naming a respected civil society leader to head the electoral commission.

President Jonathan is the first Nigerian head of state to have a Facebook page (<http://www.facebook.com/jonathangoodluck>), and is even believed to take the time to write some of the postings himself.

REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

SECTION 4

Representation and participation are two vital components of modern democracies. Nigerian legislatures have commonly been sidelined or reduced to subservience by the powerful executive, while fraud, elite manipulation, and military interference have marred the formal party and electoral systems. Thus, we emphasize unofficial methods of representation and participation through the institutions of **civil society**, which are often more important than the formal institutions.

The Legislature

Nigeria's legislature has been a primary victim of the country's political instability. Legislative structures and processes historically suffered abuse, neglect, or peremptory suspension by the executive. Until the first coup in 1966, Nigeria operated its legislature along the lines of the British Westminster model, with an elected lower house and a smaller upper house composed of individuals selected by the executive.

civil society

Refers to the space occupied by voluntary associations outside the state, for example, professional associations (lawyers, doctors, teachers), trade unions, student and women's groups, religious bodies, and other voluntary association groups.

Focus Questions

What accounts for the weakness of legislatures in Nigeria since independence?

What have been the benefits and costs of the move from ethnic parties under the early republics to the multiethnic parties of the Fourth Republic?

What role has civil society played in resisting military rule and voicing the public interest under civilian government?

For the next thirteen years of military rule, a Supreme Military Council performed legislative functions by initiating and passing decrees at will. During the second period of civilian rule, 1979–1983, the bicameral legislature was introduced similar to the U.S. system, with a Senate and House of Representatives (together known as the National Assembly) consisting of elected members.

Election to the Senate is on the basis of equal state representation, with three senators from each of the thirty-six states, plus one senator from the federal capital territory, Abuja. The practice of equal representation in the Senate is identical to that of the United States, except that each Nigerian state elects three senators instead of two. Election to the Nigerian House of Representatives is also based on state representation but weighted to reflect the relative size of each state's population, again after the U.S. example. Only eight women were elected in 1999 to sit in the Fourth Republic's National Assembly; by 2007 this number rose slightly to 33, but still constituting only 7 percent of the legislature's membership. This reflects the limited political participation of Nigerian women in formal institutions, as discussed in Section 2.

Nigerian legislatures under military governments were either powerless or non-existent. Even under civilian administrations, however, Nigerian legislatures were subjected to great pressure by the executive and have never assumed their full constitutional role. Since independence, the same party that won the executive has almost always managed to win the majority in the National Assembly and state assemblies either outright or in coalitions. Amid all the changes, one aspect of Nigerian politics has been consistent: the dominance of the executive. In fact, the president controls and disburses public revenues, despite the constitutional mandate that the National Assembly controls the public purse. The presidency typically disburses funds as it wishes, paying little attention to the budgets passed by the National Assembly.

Given this history of executive dominance, the National Assembly that took office in 1999 began its work with great uncertainty over its role in Nigerian politics. With both the House and the Senate controlled by the PDP, along with the presidency, the familiar pattern of executive dominance of the legislature through the party structures continued. Legislators spent most of their time clamoring for their personal spending funds to be disbursed by the executive and voted themselves pay raises. Other legislators, however, tested the waters for the first time with a variety of radical bills that never emerged from committee, including one that would have asked the United States to invade Nigeria if the military staged another coup. President Obasanjo, meanwhile, referred to legislators as “small boys” and rarely accorded them the respect of an equal branch of government. Legislatures at the state level face a similar imbalance of power with the governors, who control large local bureaucracies and control the funds received from the federally shared revenues.

Gradually, however, the National Assembly began to assert itself and gain some relevance. In annual budget negotiations, Assembly leaders struggled to resist presidential dominance. In August 2002, the House and the Senate, led by members of Obasanjo's own party, began impeachment proceedings against the president for refusing to disburse funds as agreed in that year's budget. The president compromised, but continued to ignore subsequent budgets, leading to two additional—and unsuccessful—attempts to impeach him.

Perhaps the greatest victory for the National Assembly was when it rejected President Obasanjo's constitutional amendments in May 2006 that would have allowed him additional terms in office. The president, however, ensured that these victories for the institution came at a heavy price for its members: Nearly 80 percent of legislators elected in 1999 were not returned in 2003, and another 80 percent did not return in 2007—not because their constituents voted them out, but because they were removed in the PDP primaries, a process that President Obasanjo and the governors largely

controlled. President Yar'Adua showed greater respect for the National Assembly during his few years in office. Most importantly, during his incapacitation, political leaders after months of inaction finally turned to the National Assembly to declare Goodluck Jonathan the acting president, rather than having the cabinet or military do so as was more common in the past. This move demonstrated that, at the very least, politicians have gained a growing respect for the legislature's constitutional role.

The Party System and Elections

An unfortunate legacy of the party and electoral systems after independence was that political parties were associated with particular ethnic groups.²² The three-region federation created by the British, with one region for each of the three biggest ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo), created strong incentives for three parties—one dominated by each group—to form. This in turn fostered a strong perception of politics as an ethnically zero-sum (or winner-takes-all) struggle for access to scarce state resources. This encouraged the political and social fragmentation that ultimately destroyed the First Republic and undermined the Second Republic. Unlike Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria did not develop an authoritarian dominant-party system after independence, which might have transcended some of these social cleavages.

In addition to the three-region structure of the federation at independence, Nigeria's use of a first-past-the-post plurality electoral system produced legislative majorities for these three parties with strong ethnic identities. During subsequent democratic experiments, many of the newer parties could trace their roots to their predecessors in the first civilian regime. Consequently, parties were more attentive to the welfare of their ethnic groups than to the development of Nigeria as a whole. In a polity as potentially volatile as Nigeria, these tendencies intensified political polarization and resentment among the losers.

In the Second Republic, the leading parties shared the same ethnic and sectional support, and often the same leadership, as the parties that were prominent in the first civilian regime. In his maneuvering steps toward creating the civilian Third Republic, General Babangida announced a landmark decision in 1989 to establish only two political parties by decree.²³ The state provided initial start-up funds, wrote the constitutions and manifestos of these parties, and designed them to be “a little to the right and a little to the left,” respectively, on the political-ideological spectrum. Interestingly, the elections that took place under these rules from 1990 to 1993 indicated that the two parties cut across the cleavages of ethnicity, regionalism, and religion, demonstrating the potential to move beyond ethnicity.²⁴ The Social Democratic Party (SDP), which emerged victorious in the 1993 national elections, was an impressive coalition of Second Republic party structures, including elements of the former UPN, NPP, PRP, and GNPP. The opposing National Republican Convention (NRC) was seen as having its roots in northern groups that were the core of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).

Table 12.8 shows historical trends in electoral patterns and communal affiliations. As clearly outlined, northern-based parties dominated the first and second experiments with civilian rule. Given this background, it is significant that Moshood Abiola was able to win the presidency in 1993, the first time in Nigeria's history that a southerner electorally defeated a northerner. Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim, won a number of key states in the north, including the hometown of his opponent. Southerners therefore perceived the decision by the northern-dominated Babangida regime to annul the June 12 elections as a deliberate attempt by the military and northern interests to maintain their decades-long domination of the highest levels of government.

Table 12.8 Federal Election Results in Nigeria, 1959–2011

Presidential Election Results, 1979–2011							
		<i>Victor (% of the vote)</i>			<i>Leading Contender (% of the vote)</i>		
1979	Shehu Shagari, NPN (33.8)				Obafemi Awolowo, UPN (29.2)		
1983	Shehu Shagari, NPN (47.3)				Obafemi Awolowo, UPN (31.1)		
1993	M.K.O. Abiola, SDP (58.0)				Bashir Tofa, NRC (42.0)		
1999	Olusegun Obasanjo, PDP (62.8)				Olu Falae, AD/APP alliance (37.2)		
2003	Olusegun Obasanjo, PDP (61.9)				Mohammadu Buhari, ANPP (31.2)		
2007	Umaru Yar'Adua, PDP (69.8)				Mohammadu Buhari, ANPP (18.7)		
2011	Goodluck Jonathan, PDP (58.9)				Mohammadu Buhari, CDC (32.0)		
Parties Controlling the Parliament/National Assembly (Both Houses) by Ethno-Regional Zone, First to Fourth Republics							
		<i>Northwest</i>	<i>North-Central</i>	<i>Northeast</i>	<i>Southwest</i>	<i>South-South</i>	<i>Southeast</i>
First	1959	NPC	NPC	NPC	<i>AG</i>	<i>AG</i>	<i>NCNC*</i>
	1964–65	NPC	NPC (NEPU)	NPC	NNDP* (AG)**	NNDP* (AG)**	<i>NCNC</i>
Second	1979	NPN	PRP (NPN, <i>UPN</i>)	GNPP (NPN)	<i>UPN</i> (NPN)	NPN (<i>UPN</i>)	NPP*
	1983	NPN	NPN (PRP)	NPN	<i>UPN</i> (NPN)	NPN	NPP**
Third	1992	NRC	<i>SDP</i> (NRC)	<i>SDP</i> (NRC)	<i>SDP</i>	NRC (<i>SDP</i>)	NRC
Fourth	1999	PDP (<i>APP</i>)	PDP	PDP (<i>APP</i>)	AD (PDP)	PDP (<i>APP</i>)	PDP
	2003	<i>ANPP</i> (PDP)	<i>ANPP</i> (PDP)	PDP (<i>ANPP</i>)	PDP AD	PDP (<i>ANPP</i>)	PDP (APGA)
	2007	<i>ANPP</i> (PDP)	PDP <i>ANPP</i>	PDP <i>ANPP</i>	PDP AC	PDP	PDP PPA
	2011	PDP CDC	PDP CDC	PDP <i>ANPP</i>	<i>ACN</i> PDP	PDP <i>ACN</i>	PDP <i>ACN</i>

Boldfaced: Ruling party
 Italicized: Leading opposition
 *Coalition with ruling party
 **Coalition with opposition

(continued)

Table 12.8		(continued)				
National Assembly and State-Level Elections						
<i>Senate</i>		<i>1999</i>		<i>2003</i>		
PDP		63		73		
APP/ANPP		26		28		
AD		20		6		
<i>House</i>		<i>1999</i>		<i>2003</i>		
PDP		214		213		
APP/ANPP		77		95		
AD		69		31		
Other				7		
<i>Governorships</i>		<i>1999</i>		<i>2003</i>		
PDP		21		28		
APP/ANPP		9		7		
AD		6		1		
<i>State Houses of Assembly</i>		<i>1999</i>		<i>2003</i>		
PDP		23		28		
APP/ANPP		8		7		
AD		5		1		
2007 Election Results						
<i>Parties</i>		<i>House of Representatives</i>			<i>Senate</i>	
		<i>Votes %</i>		<i>Seats</i>	<i>Votes %</i>	
					<i>Seats</i>	
People's Democratic Party		54.5		223	53.7	
All Nigeria People's Party		27.4		96	27.9	
Action Congress		8.8		34	9.7	
Others		2.8		7	2.7	
<i>Governorships</i>		<i>State Assemblies</i>				
26 PDP		28 PDP				
5 ANPP		5 ANPP				
2 PPA		1 PPA				
2 AC		2 AC		5814260 2013/06/12 165.24.252.60		
1 APGA						
2011 Elections						
<i>Party</i>	<i>House Votes %</i>	<i>House Seats</i>	<i>Senate Votes %</i>	<i>Senate Seats</i>	<i>Governorships</i>	<i>State Assemblies</i>
PDP	54.4	152	62.4	53	23	26
ACN	19.0	53	21.2	18	6	5

(continued)