It has also responded, if only reluctantly and defensively, to demands for change. (See Table 10.1 for an outline of Mexico’s political organization.)

Often, citizens are best able to interact with the government through a variety of informal means rather than through the formal processes of elections, campaigns, and interest group lobbying. Interacting with government through the personal and informal mechanisms of clientelism usually means that the government retains the upper hand in deciding which interests to respond to and which to ignore. For many interests, this has meant “incorporation without power.” Increasingly, however, Mexican citizens are organizing to alter this situation, and the advent of truly competitive elections has increased the possibility that citizens who organize can gain some response from government.

**The Legislature**

Students in the United States are frequently asked to study complex charts explaining how a bill becomes a law because the formal process of lawmaking affects the content of legislation. Under the old reign of the PRI in Mexico, while there were formal rules that prescribed such a process, studying them would not have been useful for understanding how the legislature worked. Because of the overwhelming dominance of the ruling party, opposition to presidential initiatives by Mexico’s two-chamber legislature, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, was rarely heard. If representatives did not agree with policies they were asked to approve, they counted on the fact that policy implementation was flexible and allowed for after-the-fact bending of the rules or disregard of measures that were harmful to important interests.

Representation in Congress has become more diverse since the end of the 1980s. A greater number of political parties are now represented; women have begun to be elected to more positions; and some representatives have also emerged from the ranks of community activists.

After 1988, the PRI’s grip on the legislature steadily weakened. By 2006, the party had only 106 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, fewer than either of its two main rivals (see Figure 10.2). The PRI subsequently made large gains

**FIGURE 10.2 Congressional Representation by Party, 2011**

in mid-term legislative elections in 2009, again becoming the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies, but the Congress remains divided between strong PRI, PAN, and PRD blocs, with no single party able to dominate proceedings. In large part because the PRI has lost its stranglehold on congressional representation, the role of the legislature in the policy process has been strengthened considerably since the late 1990s.10 The cost of greater power sharing between the executive and the legislature, however, has been a slow-down in the policy process. The biggest change, therefore, has been that the Congress has evolved from a rubber-stamp institution to one that must be negotiated with by the executive branch.

**Political Parties and the Party System**

Even under the long reign of the PRI, a number of political parties existed in Mexico. By the mid-1980s, some of them were attracting more political support, a trend that continued into the 1990s and 2000s (see Table 10.3). Electoral reforms introduced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Votes for PRI Candidate</th>
<th>Votes for PAN Candidate</th>
<th>Votes for PRD Candidate</th>
<th>Voter Turnout (% of eligible adults)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>30.95</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>16.59</td>
<td>77.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22.26</td>
<td>35.89</td>
<td>35.31</td>
<td>58.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by the López Portillo, de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations made it easier for opposition parties to contest elections and win seats in the legislature. In 1990, an electoral commission was created to regulate campaigns and elections, and in 1996 it became fully independent of the government. Now all parties receive funding from the government and have access to the media. Furthermore, in 2008, Calderón successfully pushed through congress an electoral reform law that changed how political campaigns were financed.

The PRI

Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was founded by a coalition of political elites who agreed that it was preferable to work out their conflicts within an overarching structure of compromise than to continue to resort to violence. In the 1930s, the forerunner of the PRI (the party operated under different names until 1946) incorporated a wide array of interests, becoming a mass-based party that drew support from all classes in the population. Over seven decades, its principal activities were to generate support for the government, organize the electorate to vote for its candidates, and distribute jobs and resources in return for loyalty to the system.

Until the 1990s, party organization was based largely on the corporatist representation of class interests. Labor was represented within party councils by the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), which included industry-based unions at local, regional, and national levels. Peasants were represented by the National Peasant Confederation (CNC), an organization of ejido and peasant unions and regional associations. The so-called popular sector, comprising small businesses, community-based groups, and public employees, had less internal cohesion but was represented by the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP). Of the three, the CTM was consistently the best organized and most powerful. Traditionally, the PRI’s strongest support came from the countryside, where ejidatarios and independent small farmers were dependent on rewards of land or jobs. As the country became more urbanized, the support base provided by rural communities remained important to the PRI, but produced many fewer votes than were necessary to keep the party in power.

Within its corporatist structures, the PRI functioned through extended networks that distributed public resources—particularly jobs, land, development projects, and access to public services—to lower-level activists who controlled votes at the local level. In this system, those with ambitions to hold public office or positions within the PRI put together networks of supporters from above (patrons), to whom they delivered votes, and supporters from below (clients), who traded allegiance for access to public resources. For well over half a century, this system worked extremely well. PRI candidates won by overwhelming majorities until the 1980s (see Figure 10.3). Of course, electoral fraud and the ability to distribute government largesse are central explanations for these numbers, but they also attest to an extremely well-organized party.

Within the PRI, power was centralized, and the sector organizations (the CTM, the CNC, and the CNOP) responded primarily to elites at the top of the political pyramid rather than to member interests. Over time, the corporate interest group organizations, particularly the CTM and the CNC, became widely identified with corruption, boasism, centralized control, and a lack of effective participation. By the 1980s, new generations of voters were less beholden to patronage-style politics and much more willing to question the party’s dominance. When the administrations of de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo imposed harsh austerity measures, the PRI was held responsible for the resulting losses in incomes and benefits. Simultaneously, as the government cut back sharply on public sector jobs and services, the PRI had far fewer
resources to distribute to maintain its traditional bases of support. Moreover, it began to suffer from increasing internal dissension between the old guard—the so-called dinosaurs—and the “modernizers” who wanted to reform the party.

In the late 1980s, the PRI began to be challenged by parties to the right and left, and outcomes were hotly contested by the opposition, which claimed fraudulent electoral practices. As the PRI faced greater competition from other parties and continued to suffer from declining popularity, efforts were made to restructure and reform it. Party conventions were introduced in an effort to democratize the internal workings of the party, and some states and localities began to hold primaries to select PRI candidates, a significant departure from the old system of selection by party bosses.

After the PRI lost the presidency in 2000, the party faced a difficult future. In the twenty-first century, Mexico’s voters are younger, better educated, and more middle class than they were during the period of PRI dominance. They are also more likely to live in urban areas than they were in the days of the party’s greatest success. The 1988 presidential elections demonstrated the relevance of changing demographic conditions when only 27.3 percent of the population of Mexico City voted for the PRI candidate and only 34.3 percent of the population in other urban areas supported him. By 2006, support for the party had fallen so far in the nation’s capital that only 11.68 percent of voters in the Federal District cast their ballots for PRI congressional candidates. With the vast majority of the country’s population now living in cities, the PRI will have to win the support of more urban voters. Nonetheless, the PRI
continues to be one of Mexico’s most important political parties, and many observers believe that the party could return to power. It did not, as some predicted, dissolve once it lost the ability to control the presidency. It is still the only party that has a presence in every region of the country, and after the violence and legislative gridlock of recent years, some Mexicans believe that the PRI could draw upon its long experience in government to offer a greater degree of order and stability.

The PAN

The National Action Party (PAN) was founded in 1939 to represent interests opposed to the centralization and anticlericalism of the PRI. It was established by those who believed that the country needed more than one strong political party and that opposition parties should oppose the PRI through legal and constitutional actions. Historically, this party has been strongest in northern states, where the tradition of resistance to Mexico City is also strongest. It has also been primarily an urban party of the middle class and is closely identified with the private sector. The PAN has traditionally campaigned on a platform endorsing greater regional autonomy, less government intervention in the economy, reduced regulation of business, clean and fair elections, rapprochement with the Catholic Church, and support for private and religious education. When PRI governments of the 1980s and 1990s moved toward market-friendly and export-oriented policies, the policy differences between the two parties were significantly reduced. Nevertheless, a major difference of perspectives about religion continued to characterize the two parties.

For many years, the PAN was able to elect only 9 to 10 percent of all deputies to the national congress and to capture control of only a few municipal governments. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, it was able to take advantage both of the economic crises (and the PRI’s subsequent weakened ability to control the political process) and political reforms to increase its power. By 2011, the PAN controlled the governorships of seven states, was the largest party in the Mexican Senate, and was the second-largest party in the Chamber of Deputies, after the PRI.

In 2000, the party took the unusual step of nominating Vicente Fox for the presidency, despite the fact that he was not a longstanding member of the party. Many party insiders considered him to be an opportunistic newcomer, and they worked to limit his ability to run for office, forcing him to look for other sources for financing his campaign. Starting in 1997, the “Friends of Fox” organization began to raise funds and promote his candidacy for president. Fox gained in popularity throughout the country, and in 1999, the party had little option but to nominate him as its candidate. The Friends of Fox continued to provide the most important source of campaign support, however, and when Fox won the presidential election, the PAN organization was weak and not at all united in backing him. His inability to capitalize on his electoral victory and push forward a more ambitious package of reforms allowed the party insiders to regain control of the nominating process and advance the candidacy of Felipe Calderón in 2006. Unlike Fox, he was a lifelong member of the PAN and was the son of one of the PAN’s founding members.

The PRD

Another significant challenge to the PRI has come from the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), a populist, nationalist, and leftist alternative to the PRI. Its candidate in the 1988 and 1994 elections was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of Mexico’s most famous and revered president. He was a PRI insider until party leaders virtually ejected him for demanding internal reform of the party and a platform emphasizing social
justice. In the 1988 elections, Cárdenas was officially credited with winning 31.1 percent of the vote, and his party captured 139 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. He benefited from massive political defection from the PRI and garnered support from workers disaffected with the boss-dominated unions, as well as from peasants who remembered his father’s concern for agrarian reform and the welfare of the poor.

Even while the votes were being counted, the party began to denounce widespread electoral fraud and claim that Cárdenas would have won if the election had been honest. The party challenged a number of vote counts in the courts and walked out on the inaugural speech given by the PRI’s Salinas. Considerable public opinion supported the party’s challenge. After the 1988 elections, then, it seemed that the PRD was a strong contender to become Mexico’s second-most-powerful party. It was expected to have a real chance in future years to challenge the PRI’s “right” to the presidency.

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of these elections, the party was plagued by internal divisions over its platform, leadership, organizational structure, and election strategy. By 1994, it still lagged far behind the PRI and the PAN in establishing and maintaining the local constituency organizations needed to mobilize votes and monitor the election process. In addition, the PRD found it difficult to define an appropriate left-of-center alternative to the market-oriented policies carried out by the government. In the 1994 elections, Cárdenas won only 17 percent of the vote.

Thanks to the government’s continued unpopular economic policies and the leadership of a successful grassroots mobilizer named Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who was elected to head the party in 1996, the PRD began to stage a remarkable turnaround. Factional bickering was controlled, and organizational discipline increased. In addition, the PRD proved successful in moving beyond its regional strongholds and established itself as a truly national party.

Thanks largely to its control over the capital city and the existence of PRD administrations on the municipal level in parts of the country, the party was able to boast that about a quarter of the country’s population lived under a PRD government. Furthermore, under the leadership of López Obrador, the PRD’s prospects for the 2006 elections looked good. Indeed, for most of 2005, polls indicated that López Obrador was the clear favorite to win the presidency. In early 2006, however, Calderón was able to shift the focus of his campaign and raise fears that a López Obrador presidency would threaten the stability of Mexico’s economy. The election was hard fought and characterized by growing animosity. In the end, Calderón was able to win by a narrow margin. López Obrador refused to concede defeat and staged several protests, including a shadow inauguration where he declared himself the “legitimate” president of Mexico.

López Obrador’s response to the outcome of the 2006 election split public opinion and created another debilitating divide in the PRD, this time between those who supported López Obrador’s claims and more pragmatic party leaders who favored looking to the future. The pragmatists won control of the party, and in several recent state elections, the PRD has even formed alliances with the PAN, despite a lack of ideological common ground, in order to defeat a resurgent PRI. Meanwhile, López Obrador and his allies have criticized this strategy and cultivated the support of smaller parties. Though the PRD continues to govern the Federal District and several states, these deep divisions within the party make its future prospects uncertain.

Other Parties

There are a number of smaller parties that contest elections in Mexico. In 2011, the most important small parties were: Convergencia (Convergence); Partido del Trabajo (PT, Labor Party); Partido Verde Ecologista Mexicana (PVEM, Green Party); and
Partido Nueva Alianza (New Alliance Party). Since Mexican law requires parties to receive at least 2.5 percent of the vote to be able to compete in future elections, the long-term viability of some of these organizations is doubtful. Small parties, however, usually do win a few of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate that are filled by proportional representation. Also, these groups sometimes wield influence on national politics by forming alliances with the larger parties, either endorsing their candidates for president or governor in national and state elections or backing a single slate of candidates for congress. For example, in 2006, Convergence and the PT formed an alliance—the Coalition for the Good of All—with the PRD, while the Green Party joined with the PRI in the Alliance for Mexico. Though these parties can boost the fortunes of larger parties by forming alliances with them, they also have the potential to become a place of refuge for dissident factions that have lost out in internal struggles within the major parties, as is illustrated by the growing ties between the PT and supporters of Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the PRD.

Elections

Each of the three main political parties draws voters from a wide and overlapping spectrum of the electorate. Nevertheless, a typical voter for the PRI is likely to be from a rural area or small town, to have less education, and to be older and poorer than voters for the other parties. A typical voter for the PAN is likely to be from a northern state, to live in an urban area, to be a middle-class professional, to have a comfortable lifestyle, and to have a high school or even a university education. A typical voter for the PRD is likely to be young, to be a political activist, to have an elementary or high school education, to live in one of the central states, and to live in a small town or an urban area. As we have seen, the support base for the PRI is the most vulnerable to economic and demographic changes in the country. Voting for opposition parties is an urban phenomenon, and a large majority of the Mexican population today lives in urban areas. This means that in order to stay competitive, the PRI will have to garner more support from cities and large towns. It must also be able to appeal to younger voters, especially the large numbers who are attracted to the PRD and the PAN.

Since 1994, elections have been more competitive and much fairer than they were during decades of PRI dominance, and subsequent congressional, state, and municipal elections reinforced the impression that electoral fraud is on the wane in many areas. The PAN’s victory in 2000 substantially increased this impression. When López Obrador claimed in 2006 that Calderón’s victory was fraudulent, the legitimacy of the federal electoral authorities was questioned, but no evidence of wide-scale fraud or election tampering was ever uncovered.

Political Culture, Citizenship, and Identity

Most Mexicans have a deep familiarity with how their political system works and the ways in which they might be able to extract benefits from it. They understand the informal rules of the game in Mexican politics that have helped maintain political stability despite extensive inequalities in economic and political power. Clientelism has long been a form of participation in the sense that through their connections, many people, even the poorest, are able to interact with public officials and get something out of the political system. This kind of participation emphasizes how limited
resources, such as access to health care, can be distributed in a way that provides maximum political payoff. This informal system is a fundamental reason that many Mexicans continued to vote for the PRI for so long.

However, new ways of interacting with government are emerging, and they coexist along with the clientelistic style of the past. An increasing number of citizens are seeking to negotiate with the government on the basis of citizenship rights, not personal patron-client relationships. The movements that emerged in the 1980s sought to form broad but loose coalitions with other organizations and attempted to identify and work with reform-oriented public officials. Their suspicion of traditional political organizations such as the PRI and its affiliates also led them to avoid close alliances with other parties, such as the PAN and the PRD.

As politics and elections became more open and competitive, the roles of public opinion and the mass media have become more important. Today, the media play an important role in forming public opinion in Mexico. As with other aspects of Mexican politics, the media began to become more independent in the 1980s, enjoying a “spring” of greater independence and diversity of opinion. There are currently several major television networks in the country, and many citizens have access to CNN and other global networks. The number of newspapers is expanding, as is their circulation, and several news magazines play the same role in Mexico that Time and NewswEEK do in the United States. To be sure, there is some concern that many of the most important and influential media outlets in the country are controlled by a small number of individuals and corporations. Also, violence against and intimidation of Mexican journalists by drug trafficking organizations has limited the ability of the press to report on the important issues raised in the context of the fight against organized crime in recent years. Nonetheless, citizens in Mexico today hear a much wider range of opinion and much greater reporting of debates about public policy and criticism of government than at any time previously.

### Interests, Social Movements, and Protest

The Mexican political system has long responded to groups of citizens through pragmatic accommodation to their interests. This is one important reason that political tensions among major interests have rarely escalated into the kind of serious conflict that can threaten stability. Where open conflict has occurred, it has generally been met with efforts to find some kind of compromise solution. Accommodation has been particularly apparent in response to the interests of business. Mexico’s development strategy encouraged the growth of wealthy elites in commerce, finance, industry, and agriculture (see Section 2).

Labor has been similarly accommodated within the system. Wage levels for unionized workers grew fairly consistently between 1940 and 1982, when the economic crisis caused a significant drop in wages. At the same time, labor interests were attended to through concrete benefits and limitations on the rights of employers to discipline or dismiss workers. Union leaders controlled their rank and file in the interest of their own power to negotiate with government, but at the same time, they sought benefits for workers who continued to provide support for the PRI. The power of the union bosses has declined, in part because the unions are weaker than in the past, in part because union members are demanding greater democratization, and in part because the PRI no longer monopolizes political power. Likewise, in the countryside, rural organizations have gained greater independence from the government. Indigenous groups have also emerged to demand that government be responsive to their needs.
and respectful of their traditions. Since 1994, the Zapatista rebels in Chiapas, who are still engaged in largely nonviolent opposition to the Mexican state, have become a focal point for broad alliances of those concerned about the rights of indigenous groups (ethnic minorities) and rural poverty.

Despite the strong and controlling role of the PRI in Mexico’s political history, the country also has a tradition of civic organizations that operate at community and local levels with considerable independence from politics. Urban popular movements, formed by low- and modest-income (popular) groups, gained renewed vitality in the 1980s. When the economic crisis resulted in drastic reductions of social welfare spending and city services, working- and middle-class neighborhoods forged new coalitions and greatly expanded the national discussion of urban problems. The Mexico City earthquake of 1985 encouraged the formation of unprecedented numbers of grassroots movements in response to the slow and poorly managed relief efforts of the government. The elections of 1988 and 1994 provided these groups with significant opportunities to press parties and candidates to respond to their needs. As the opposition parties expanded rapidly, some leaders of urban movements enrolled as candidates for public office.

Urban popular movements bring citizens together around needs and ideals that cut across class boundaries. Neighborhood improvement, the environment, local self-government, economic development, feminism, and professional identity have been among the factors that have forged links among these groups. Women have begun to mobilize in many cities to demand community services, equal pay, legal equality, and opportunities in business that have traditionally been denied to them.

Previously, parties of the left focused most of their attention on questions of economic redistribution, but this has recently begun to change. Political issues that are commonly discussed in the United States, such as abortion and gay rights, have
recently begun to be debated publicly in Mexico. In April 2007, the PRD-controlled legislature of Mexico City voted to decriminalize abortions in the first trimester (in the rest of Mexico abortion continues to be illegal except in cases of rape or severe birth defects, although in fact gaining access to a legal abortion even under these circumstances is exceedingly difficult). And in November 2006, the PRD voted to legalize gay civil unions in the Federal District. The PAN remains vehemently opposed to these measures. For example, in 2000 the PAN-dominated legislature of Guanajuato voted to ban abortion even in the case of rape, and established penalties of up to three years in prison for women who violated the law.

Although President Vicente Fox was opposed to abortion, he did attempt to distance himself from the Guanajuato law and for the most part avoided discussing contentious social and cultural subjects. But under his administration condom use was encouraged and a campaign against homophobia was launched. In 2004, he caused a furor within his own party when his administration approved the distribution of the morning-after pill in public clinics. These policies were denounced by Calderón, who vowed in his 2006 campaign to ban the use of this pill and openly expressed his opposition to abortion and gay rights.

Summary

Democratic politics is growing stronger in Mexico. The elections of 2000 and 2006 demonstrated that a transition of power from a civilian authoritarian regime to a more democratic one could take place relatively peacefully. The causes of this important change emerged gradually, as Mexican citizens developed the capacity to question the dominance of the PRI regime and as the government introduced important changes that opened up opportunities for opposition parties to develop and for people to vote more easily for these parties. Parties such as the PAN and the PRD are developing greater capacity to campaign effectively for office, and civil society groups are becoming better organized and more capable of having an impact on government policies. Citizens are also enjoying greater access to a variety of sources of information about government. Challenges remain in terms of how citizens in Mexico relate to the political system and the government, but trends toward the consolidation of an effective democratic political system are positive.

The Mexican political landscape has been transformed over the past twenty years, as a long period of dominance by a single party has given way to a competitive multi-party system. The country’s institutions, leaders, and citizens are still adjusting to this ongoing process of change. While most Mexicans are proud that their political system has become more democratic, many also lament that the division of power between political parties and branches of government at times seems to make the state less efficient and possibly less able to address effectively the challenges of development and governance faced by Mexico.

One particularly dramatic illustration of how much Mexican politics has changed in recent decades can be seen on September 1 of each year, when, in accordance with